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Secular vs. Sacred: NEPA Again Proves to be an Ineffective Tool to
Protect Sacred Land
Pit River Tribe, et al. v. United States Forest Service, et al.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Geothermal energy has been described as the "sleeping giant" of
the United States' energy reserves.2 The steam from geothermal sources
can be used to turn turbines, creating electricity with little pollution; the
technology holds the promise of reducing reliance on fossil fuels such as
coal or natural gas.3 Large reserves of geothermal energy lay beneath
public lands in the western United States.4 One such area of accessible
geothermal energy is located around Medicine Lake Volcano in Northern
California.s
While the Medicine Lake Volcano is classified as dormant, the
area remains a "hotspot" of geothermal activity7 and has recently become
a hotspot of conflict over the development of geothermal energy. The
federal government has encouraged the development of geothermal energy
on federally owned land at places like Medicine Lake. However, this
secular development which began decades ago, threatens the sacred use of
the land by the Pit River Tribe ("Tribe") which has cultural, historical, and
'615 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Pit River").
2 Alan Bible, The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970. 8 IDAHO L. REv. 86, 92 (1971).
Senator Bible of Nevada was one of the sponsors of the Geothermal Steam Act.3 Id. at 86. Geothermal steam can also be used indirectly to heat homes or in industrial
applications. Id.
4 id.
Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Pit River I").
6 The Geology ofLava Beds National Park Service, available at http://www.nps.gov/labe
planyourvisit/upload/GEOLOGY.pdf (last visited October 20, 2011).
Julie M. Donnelly-Nolan, et al., Volcano Hazards Assessment for Medicine Lake
Volcano, Northern California, United States Geological Survey Scientific Investigations
Report 2007-5174-A-26, 8 (2007), http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5174/a/sir2007-5174a
text.pdf.
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spiritual connections to the area.8 This conflict led the Tribe to sue the
developer which holds a lease and the federal agencies which hold title to
the land in an attempt to stop the development.9
The Medicine Lake region appears to be exactly the type of land
that Congress envisionedo for geothermal development when it passed the
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 ("the Act")." The geothermal hotspot is
located on federally owned land and is not protected as a national park.
While the Act does not expressly authorize the leasing of geothermal
rights on Indian land, the land at issue is not part of the Pit River Tribe's
reservation. 12 Despite the fact that the legal discussion in the case focuses
on lease terms and civil procedure, the heart of the dispute concerns the
beneficial, secular use of sacred lands, which are held by the public.
Following an analysis of Pit River, two conclusions will follow.
First, laws that ensure federal agencies follow proper procedure, such as
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")" and the
National Historic Preservation Act ("Preservation Act"),14 do not protect a
site merely because it is sacred to an Indian tribe. At best, the current laws
only serve to delay development, not stop it. Second, if sacred Indian sites
are to be adequately protected, a moderate substantive law must be passed.
This note will propose a measure modeled off of the Preservation Act that
will allow Indian tribes to request a site be added to a registry of sacred
sites, thus affording the site some substantive protection.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Pit River Tribe ("Tribe") is a federally recognized sovereign
Indian tribe 's with around 1,800 people enrolled. 16 The Tribe's
Id.; see also Opening Brief for Appellant at 8, Pit River Tribe v. U. S. Forest Serv., 615
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-15385), 2009 WL 3651827.
9 See Pit River 1, 469 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2006).
10 Bible, supra note 2, at 88.
" Pit River 1, 469 F.3d at 772-73.
12 d
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
14 See 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006).
15 Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 2.
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reservation is located in northeastern California; however, its ancestral
lands occupy a much larger area.' 7 The land around Medicine Lake,
California has been used for spiritual and cultural purposes for thousands
of years, although it lies out of the currently recognized reservation.'8
In 1988, the predecessor to defendant Calpine Corporation'
("Calpine") entered into two exclusive lease agreements with the Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM") to develop geothermal energy in the
Medicine Lake region of California 2 0 under the Geothermal Steam Act.21
After exploring the region, Calpine submitted a plan for the development
of the leasehold to the BLM in 1995. Three years later in May 1998, the
BLM extended Calpine's lease for five years. 22 While the BLM provided
Environmental Impact Statements ("EIS") as required by NEPA for the
initial lease, they failed to prepare EISs for the 1998 and subsequent lease
23extensions. Lease extensions became mandatory under the amended
statute and regulations so long as the lessee met minimum requirements.24
The federal agencies25 charged with overseeing the project did issue an
6 California Indians and Their Reservations, San Diego State Univ. Library, http://
library.sdsu.edu/guides/sub2.php?id= 1 95&pg= 195 (last visited October 10, 2011).
" Id.
8 Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 8.
9 The initial lease was granted to Freeport-McMoran Resource Partners Limited
Partnership. Pit River , 469 F.3d 768, 775 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). The partnership entered
into a cooperative agreement with Calpine in 1994 and fully assigned its leases to Calpine
in 1996. Id.
20 Pit River, 616 F.3d at 1073. The Medicine Lake Volcano sits in northern California
and is the largest volcano in the Cascade Mountains. Medicine Lake Vicinity, United
Stated Geological Survey, available at http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Volcanoes/Medicine
Lake/description medicinelake.html (last visited January 1, 2012).
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (2006).
22 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1073.
23 Id.
24 30 U.S.C. § 1005 (2006); see also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
2 The Bureau of Land Management was the agency that managed the leasing process.
The United States Forest Service and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation also
had input into the granting of geothermal leases at issue here. Pit River, 615 F.3d at
1073.
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EIS for Fourmile Hill Plant, the proposed geothermal facility.2 6 In 2002,
the BLM again extended Calpine's lease, this time for forty years.27
Following the Calpine's forty-year extension, the Tribe sued,28
alleging violations of NEPA29 and the Preservation Act.30 31 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant federal agencies and Calpine,
and to which the Tribe subsequently appealed.32 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit found the federal agencies violated NEPA by failing to prepare an
EIS before each lease extension was granted.33 The court found the lease
extensions to be invalid and remanded the case to the district court with an
order to grant summary judgment to the Tribe.34
Again at the district court, the parties could not agree on the proper
remedy for the NEPA violations.3 5  The Tribe contended that since
Calpine possessed invalid geothermal leases, then the whole development
process would have to start from scratch, including reopening the
competitive bidding process for the leases. 36 Unpersuaded, the court
vacated the lease extensions but remanded the issue to the BLM, ordering
the agency to complete the necessary EISs before deciding whether the
lease extensions would be appropriate. 37 The Tribe appealed the remand
order, giving rise to the instant case.
On review, the circuit court found that although the district court's
remand order did not constitute a final decision for purposes of § 129 1,38 it
26 d
27 d
28 Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 306 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Cal. 2004) rev'd
sub nom. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006).
29 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
30 See 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006).
31 Pit River, 615 F.3d. at 1073.32 d.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1073-74.
" Id. at 1074.
36 d
"Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1074.
38 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1982).
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had appellate jurisdiction under the All Writs Act 39 and ruled
accordingly. 40 The circuit court ultimately upheld the district court's
ruling that federal agencies had appropriate authority to review and renew
the leases.4 1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While on the surface, the case concerns land that has served an
important role in "Native American cultural and religious ceremonies for
countless generations," the legal issues involve procedural law rather than
substantive law.42 At the heart of this case is whether leases granted to
Calpine under the Geothermal Steam Act followed the parallel procedural
requirements of NEPA and the Preservation Act. The court settled many
of the issues concerning compliance with NEPA and the Preservation Act
in Pit River I; however in the instant case, the issue concerned whether the
lower court's actions complied with the Ninth Circuit's remand order from
the first case.
This section examines the jurisdictional background the court
relied upon to establish jurisdiction and the substantive and procedural
laws it interpreted in its final ruling.
A. Jurisdiction
Although both parties made little effort to establish the circuit
court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court focused on several issues
concerning jurisdiction. Eventually, the court found and exercised
jurisdiction under the All Writs Act.
39 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1077-78; see also 28 USC §1651(a) (1949).4 0 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1079-80.
41 Id. at 1085.42 Response Brief of Federal Appellees at 1-2, Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 04-15746), 2004 WL 3020940.
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1. 28 USC §1291: The Final Judgment Rule
In Pit River, both the Tribe and Calpine asserted the court had
jurisdiction under the final judgment rule.43 The final judgment rule
grants circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over the final decisions of
district courts," however, uncertainty can exist as to what constitutes a
final decision. Generally, when a court remands a decision to a federal
agency, that order is not considered "final" for purposes of the final
judgment rule.4 5 Following Pit River I, the district court issued such a
remand to the BLM, which had issued the geothermal lease to Calpine.46
The "administrative remand rule" states that remand orders to
federal agencies are not final since an agency could grant the relief that a
party would request in an appeal.47 Nonetheless, there are circumstances
in which a remand to an agency might be considered a final decision.
Those circumstances include when all of the following criteria are
satisfied: "(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal
issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially
erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review
would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were
unavailable.""8 The general exception to the rule is when the agency itself
appeals the remand order.49
43 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1074.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) ("The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the
jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.").
4 Pit River, 614 F.3d at 1075 (citing Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457
(9th Cir. 1990)).
46 Id. at 1073.
47 Id. at 1975-76.
48 Id. at 1075 (citing Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep't of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184
(9th Cir. 2004)).
49 Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep't of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)
(stating that because an administrative remand effectively forces an agency to go back
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Since agencies' rulemaking and decision processes are governed
by procedures which allow for public-input rules and regulations, parties
may be able to get the relief they seek by working through the agency's
rules. Another Ninth Circuit case demonstrates why administrative
remands do not constitute a final judgment.
In Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep't of Commerce,so the plaintiff
challenged the classification of Coho salmon as a "threatened" species.51
A district court invalidated the classification and remanded the case to the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS").52 The NMFS agreed to
comply with the order, and announced it would begin a public rules
creation process.5 3 Unsatisfied that the NFMS failed to appeal the ruling,
the Oregon Natural Resource Council intervened in the case and appealed
to the court of appeals. 54 The court of appeals found the district court's
remand ruling met the first two criteria for an agency decision to be
considered a final decision. However, the court ruled that the third
criterion had not been satisfied, and thus the court had no jurisdiction
because the decision was not a final decision.56 In examining the third
criterion, the court noted the only instances in which it had found a
remand order to constitute a final decision occurred when an agency itself
had appealed a ruling.57 The court reasoned that "only agencies compelled
to refashion their own rules face the prospect of being deprived of review
altogether."5 8 However, the court did not close the door to the possibility
that a non-agency litigant may be able to appeal an agency remand.59 In
Alsea, the court found there was the possibility the appellant could receive
and reconsider an action or decision, a remand order is final in its perspective); see also
infra note 51 and accompanying text.
5 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).
n Alsea Valley Alliance, 358 F.3d at 1183.52 id.
s3 Pit River, 614 F.3d at 1075.
54 id.
55 id.
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the relief desired through the rulemaking process, thus the decision was
not final.60
2. 28 USC § 1292: An Exception to the Final Judgment Rule
Calpine contended the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction under an
exception6 to the final judgment rule, which allows the appeal of some
interlocutory orders.62 The exception is to be construed narrowly. The
court noted a line of cases have found jurisdiction appropriately exercised
when an order has the "practical effect of granting, denying, or modifying
injunctive relief." 64  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has found that
exercising jurisdiction under the statue's exception to the final judgment
rule is appropriate when a ruling "(1) ha[s] the practical effect of entering
an injunction, (2) ha[s] serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences, and (3)
[is] such that an immediate appeal is the only effective way to challenge
it."65
In Alsea, the court held it was "far too tenuous" to find that a
judgment, which invalidated an agency rule, amounted to an injunction.
The court reasoned that finding such an injunction would violate the
principles of § 1292, a statute intended to only create a narrow exception.66
3. 28 USC § 1651(a): The All Writs Act
Both Calpine and the Tribe further contended the court has
jurisdiction under the All Writs Act,67 providing a broad grant of
jurisdiction giving courts the power to issue writs "necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 68 Exercising
60 d. at 1185.
6'28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006).62 Id. Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1077.
63 Alsea Valley Alliance, 358 F.3d at 1186.
MId. (citing Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)).
6s Pit River, 614 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 137 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998)).66 Id. at 1078.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
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jurisdiction under this provision would be appropriate if a lower court did
not follow a remand order from a higher court.6 9 Writs of mandamus have
been used by appellate courts to limit the actions of a lower court or to
compel a lower court to act when it has a duty to do so. 70 Mandamus is an
appropriate remedy "when a lower court obstructs the mandate of an
appellate court."7 1 Although the Ninth Circuit has developed factors to
consider in mandamus review, 72 it is ultimately within the court's
discretion whether to issue a writ of mandamus. 73
B. Geothermal Steam Act
The leases at the heart of the Pit River conflict were issued under
the authority granted by the Geothermal Steam Act ("Steam Act").74 The
Steam Act passed with the dual goal of providing a managed development
of geothermal resources on federal land7 5 and protecting "significant
thermal features within units of the National Park system" from such
6 9 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1079.
70 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n.,
319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
71 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1078 (citing Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Wash.,
173 F.3d 713 718-19 (9th Cir. 1999)).
72 The factors are: "(1) whether the petitioner has no other means, such as a direct appeal,
to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in
any way not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the district court's order is clearly
erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court's order is an oft repeated error
or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) whether the district court's
order raises new and important problems or issues of first impression." Bauman v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977).
7 See Cole v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 366 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2004).
7 30 U.S.C. §§ 100 1-1027 (2006).
7 Geo-Energy Partners-1983 Ltd. v. Salazar, 613 F.3d 946, 960 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Cong. Rec. H732-02 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988) (statement of Rep. Rahall) ("[T]he
purpose of S. 1889 as amended is to provide for the orderly development of Federal
geothermal resources, and to ensure the protection of significant thermal features within
units of the National Park System from potential geothermal development activities.")).
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development. 76 In addition, development is not authorized on lands held
by Indian trusts and those within Indian reservations.
The Steam Act provides for both new leases for the purpose of
developing geothermal enerq and for the conversion of existing mining
rights to geothermal leases. In the original act, an initial geothermal
lease was set for a period of ten years, with the BLM having the option of
granting five-year extensions thereafter. 79 Amendments to the Steam Act
made the lease extensions mandatory if certain requirements were met;
such guidelines included timely payment and minimum work
requirements. Since the procedural requirements of NEPA only have a
bearing on discretionary decisions, this amendment had the effect of
making extensions to leases granted after the August 8, 2005, effective
date not subject to NEPA regulations.8 However, there remained a
question as to whether lease extensions granted pre-2005 also fell under
the mandatory language of the regulations, thus evading the requirements
of NEPA.82 The BLM promulgated rules giving those with leases under
the previous version of the act an option to have the new language apply to
future extensions. 83
C. National Environmental Protection Act
Heralded as landmark legislation, NEPA directed the federal
government to stud and consider the potential environmental impact of
its major decisions. NEPA has been called "our basic national charter
76 30 U.S.C. § 1001(f) (2006); see also 30 U.S.C. §1026 (2006) (providing a more
extensive list of units which are not subject to lease); 30 U.S.C. § 1027 (2006) (including
a list from a section on mining rights of excluded federal lands).
" 30 U.S.C. § 1014(c)(4) (2006).
7 30 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006).
9 30 U.S.C. § 1005 (2006).
so See id. (a)(2), (a)(3), and (b); see also Pit River I, 469 F.3d 768, 780-81 (9th Cir.
2006).
8 Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 780 (noting that NEPA's requirements only apply to
discretionary decisions-mandatory actions are exempted).
82 id.
83 43 C.F.R. § 3200.7(a)(2) (2007).84 Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 781.
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for protection of the environment."85 NEPA's purpose is not to direct
action towards a specific result, but rather to ensure procedural safeguards
are followed and those making decisions are informed of environmental
consequences of an agency's action.86 Since NEPA is designed to force
the federal government to consider the environmental impacts of
discretionary decisions, if an agency is obligated to act or to refrain from
action, there is no purpose for fulfilling the procedural requirements of
NEPA.87
Prior to the 2005 amendments, the decision to grant a geothermal
lease under the Steam Act was both discretionary88 and had the potential
to impact the environment, thus triggering NEPA. 8 9 NEPA, inter alia,
requires all federal agencies to prepare an "environmental impact
statement" ("EIS") prior to "(1) every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and (2) other major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."90
Federal actions which have been ruled to trigger NEPA's
requirement for an EIS include "direct" environmental actions such as
permits to dredge national waterways or to work in navigable
waterways.91 It has also been found to include "indirect" environmental
impacts caused by actions of federal agencies overseas. 92
Judicial review of an agency's compliance with NEPA is
authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").93 The APA
requires a plaintiff challenging a finding of no significant impact to show
the agency acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in issuing the
85 Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental
Impact Assessments and Alternatives, SR045 ALI-ABA 757, 759 (2010) (quoting Blue
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998)).
86 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
7 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 769 (2004) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1).8 Pit River 1, 469 F.3d at 780.
89 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
90 Id.
9' Marsh, 490 U.S. 360, 385 (1989).
92 Chertok, supra note 85, at 762 (noting decision by federal agencies to incinerate food
waste at Antarctica camps was covered by NEPA, and in two cases, Department of
Defense installations abroad were exempt).
9 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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finding.9 4 In determining whether the agency conducting the review acted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, a court will look at whether the
agency took a "hard look" at the environmental impact of its proposed
action.9 5 To evaluate whether the agency took a "hard look," a court
should:
consider whether the [agency's] decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. The final inquiry is whether the Secretary's
action followed the necessary procedural requirements. 96
The APA specifically authorizes two remedies: (1) compelling the
agency to act97 and (2) "set[ting] aside" the offending decision, actions, or
98findings. In the context of a NEPA case, if a court finds an agency
violated NEPA procedures, then the agency action will typically be
vacated. 99
94 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). This standard of review has been used by the Supreme
Court and followed by a variety of circuits including the Ninth. See Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1989); Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); Inland Empire Pub. Lands
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1996); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823, 827-29 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
9s "The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus realized through a
set of 'action-forcing' procedures that require that agencies take a 'hard look at
environmental consequences. . . ."' Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
96 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139-40 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
9 The APA's emphasis on deference to the administrative agency allows an order to act
only if the court finds action has been unlawfully withheld or delayed. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(2006).
9' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
9 Chertok, supra note 85, at 760.
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D. National Historic Preservation Act'00
When actions may impact property of historical or cultural
significance to an Indian tribe, the tribe should have an opportunity to
participate in the consideration process.1 The Preservation Act requires
the head of any federal agency to take into account the effect of its action
on property that is included, or is eligible for inclusion, in the National
Register of Historic Places.' 02 The Preservation Act also requires giving
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation time to comment on the
effects of action. 103 The Preservation Act's purpose and procedural
requirements are similar to NEPA, with the Preservation Act focusing on
federal impacts to historic property as opposed to environmental
impacts. 104 Like NEPA, the Preservation Act does not advocate a
particular outcome, but requires a "hard look" at the consequences of a
proposed action. 05 As with NEPA, courts review decisions under the
Preservation Act to ensure decisions are neither arbitrary nor capricious.106
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Pit River, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court's ruling to
remand the case to the federal agencies. The decision focused on several
matters regarding the court's appellate jurisdiction, specifically whether
the district court's remand order constituted a final decision. Ultimately,
the Ninth Circuit found it possessed jurisdiction to hear the case under the
100 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006).
101 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii) (2000).
1o2 36 C.F.R. § 801.1 (1981).
o3 Id. at § 801.1(c).United States v. 0.95 Acres of Land, 994 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1993).1os United States v. 162.20 Acres of Land, 639 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1981); but see
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, n.1 (1978) (which indicates
however that, like NEPA, the Preservation Act has an implicit goal of preserving sites of
"architectural, or cultural significance").
106 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. F.A.A., 161 F.3d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Communities, Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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All Writs Act, 0 7 and upon examination of the merits of the appeal, found
the district court had ruled properly. 08
A. Jurisdiction
The Ninth Circuit concluded it did not have jurisdiction under
either the final judgment rule or the exception for interlocutory appeals.
The court first noted the appeal stemmed from a district court's
administrative remand order. 09 Since the Tribe might have been given its
desired result at the agency level, for example if the BLM had restarted the
leasing process, the court found the district court's remand order did not
constitute a "final decision."'10
Calpine argued the decision was a final judgment and thus
appealable due to the manner in which the district court handled the
remand order."' In remanding the case to the federal agencies, the district
court dismissed the action and ruled that any further udicial action would
commence with a new federal district court case. 12 Despite this, the
Ninth Circuit found that because the Tribe had an opportunity to
participate in the agency processes which could potentially yield a
favorable outcome, the remand order did not constitute a final decision,
Calpine could not appeal the remand." 3
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether it had jurisdiction based
on the interlocutory order exception to the final judgment rule, which may
grant jurisdiction over some interlocutory orders, such as the denial of an
injunction. 14 While no injunction was asked for and thus none denied in
the district court's decision,"i5 the court noted how certain actions can
10728 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
1os Pit River, 615 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010).
'
0oId. at 1074.
HoId. at 1075-76 (citing Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.
1990)).
"
11 d. at 1076.
112 d
113id.




have the "practical effect" of an injunction." However, the court rejected
the contention that the district court's order had the effect of an
injunction." 7 Thus, the court found it did not have jurisdiction under the
final judgment rule or its primary exception.
The court's final attempt to find jurisdiction to rule on the issues
relied on the All Writs Act. " The act provides authority for all
congressionally created courts to issue orders to confine a lower court to
actions within its jurisdiction, and to compel a lower court to act when it
has a duty." 9 The court found that although the Tribe did not technically
title its appeal as a writ of mandamus, it had the substance of such a writ
because the appeal essentially asked the Ninth Circuit to order the district
court to comply with an earlier ruling. 120 Thus, the court found
jurisdiction to hear the case under the All Writs Act and proceeded to the
merits of the argument.121
B. The Merits
The primary issue on appeal before the Ninth Circuit concerned
whether the federal agencies had the power to extend the leases, which the
Tribe argued had expired in 1998 when a proper EIS was not
completed.122  In Pit River 1, the court of appeals ordered that the
geothermal leases be "undone," 23 but granted the agencies authority to
decide whether to renew the leases in the future. 124 The Tribe argued that
because these renewed leases must be "undone" back to 1998, it would not
'
1 6 Id. (citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 137 F.3d 1420, 1422
n.2 (9th Cir. 1998)).
117 Calpine argued that Pit River had asked the district court to cancel the past geothermal
leases, but in reality, Pit River argued that the leases had expired according to the terms
of the lease. Id at 1077-78.
"
8 Id. at 1078.
"928 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2006).
120 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1079.
121 Id. at 1079-80.
'
22 Id. at 1080.
123 Pit River 1, 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 2006).124 Pit River, 615 F.3d at 1080.
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be possible to merely "extend" the leases.125 Instead, the Tribe contended
the entire lease process, including competitive bidding for the leases, must
be begin anew. 1 The circuit court handily rejected this argument.127
The court considered the policy implications if a party were
allowed to challenge a lease extension and have the effect of questioning
the underlying lease agreement. It noted that such a ruling would allow
any party to effectively undo an entire lease relationship simply by
challenging the technical aspects of a single extension. The court
reasoned that this would create a loophole for statute of limitations claims
concerning leases, since any party limited from bringing a proceeding
against an original lease could instead attempt to undo the lease by
challenging its more recent extensions.129
For legal support, the court looked to general principles concerning
remedies for NEPA violations. First, the court found any relief a court
grants for NEPA violations is subject to principles of equity.' 30 The court
examined several cases where principles of equity were applied to temper
the potential remedy for a NEPA violation. In one such case, Sierra Club
v. Bosworth, the court found that although an injunction was necessary for
the public good, the need should be balanced against the hardships posed
to those who had relied upon the improper agency action in the case.,3 '
Based on similar principles of equity, the district court had attempted to
put the parties in the position they would have been in 1998, a decision the
Ninth Circuit found appropriate.132
The second point of appeal concerned the procedures used by the
district court in ordering the agency's reconsideration of the leases. 133 The





129 Pit River, 615 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).
"'od. at 1080-81.
"'Id. at 1018 (citing Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007)).
132 Id. at 1081-82.




found principles of equity provide district courts with broad discretion to
grant relief for NEPA violations.1 35 The court found these procedures
were a proper exercise of discretion by the district court.' 36
With no substantive law specifically protecting Medicine Lake
from development, the Tribe was forced to rely upon a patchwork of laws
requiring agencies follow proper procedure. However, procedure did not
provide enough protection as the Ninth Circuit found the district court's
remand was proper.
V. COMMENT
A. The Failure of NEPA to Protect Sacred Places
Pit River represents the latest in a line of cases in which Indian
tribes have attempted to halt unfavorable federal agency action through
use of NEPA's procedural requirements. Outside of designated Indian
reservations, sacred Indian sites are not protected by any substantive
law. 37 Consequently, when their sacred places are threatened, Indian
tribes have resorted primarily to the procedural requirements of NEPA and
the Preservation Act in an attempt to protect the land from development.138
However because NEPA and the Preservation Act essentially only require
a hard look at the consequences of agency action, coupled with the fact
that agency decisions are reviewed on an arbitrary and capricious
standard,139 makes blocking actions by federal agencies difficult.140
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation
Administration illustrates another attempt to use the procedural
' Pit River, 615 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010).
136 Id. at 1085 (approving the District Court's decision but remanding the case with
directions to fix a typo that lead to an inconsistency in the decision).
131 Id. at 1080-81.
138 Wetlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that in reviewing a NEPA claim, courts must avoid substituting their judgment for
that of the agency and only ensure the agency took a hard look at the consequences of
their actions).
139 39A C.J.S. Health & Env't § 147 (2011).
I140mI.
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requirements of NEPA and Preservation Act to protect sacred land.14' The
Morongo Band of Mission Indians operates a $250-million casino-resort
on its reservation in the high desert of Southern California.142 When the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") began the process of creating an
air corridor over the Indian reservation land, the tribe attempted to block
the corridor.14 3 The FAA considered the tribe's objections to the proposed
change in flight path, and even entertained a proposal which would move
the new air path north of the tribe's land. However, the FAA eventually
rejected the tribe's proposal.'" Unlike Pit River I, which found that the
BLM neglected several procedural requirements of NEPA and the
Preservation Act, the court in this case found that FAA had followed all of
the procedural requirements.145
A cynical observer might characterize the dispute in Morongo not
as sacred versus secular, but rather as the age-old NIMBY146 problem.
Morongo illustrates the conundrum that could potentially arise if sacred
sites are given more protection under either environmental or historical
preservation laws: how do you separate the sacred from the secular? Was
the Morongo tribe concerned with their sacred and spiritual land, or were
they more concerned about the detrimental impact on the casino and resort
also operated on their reservation?
One reason lawmakers may seem hesitant to put any substantive
requirements into the Preservation Act or include consideration for sacred
sites in NEPA is evidenced in a case arising from a dispute north of
Medicine Lake. 147 In an administrative hearing before the Interior Board
of Land Appeals ("IBLA"), Klamath Tribes challenged geothermal
141 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998). Even though the land at issue in the Morongo case was
a part of the Morongo Tribe's reservation, the attempt to use NEPA in an unattended
manner is illustrative of the potential for abuse.
142 About Morongo: The Morongo Band of Mission Indians, MORONGO (Nov. 2011),
http://www.morongocasinoresort.com/about-morongo-casino ("The present $250 million
destination which opened in late 2004, the Morongo Casino, Resort & Spa, is one of the
largest tribal gaming facilities in the nation.").
143 Morongo, 161 F.3d at 572.
'"Id. at 572-73.
145 Id. at 583.
146 NIMBY stands for "not in my backyard."
147 See Pit River, 469 F.3d at 768.
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exploration in the Deschutes National Forest in Oregon. 14 8 The Klamath
Tribes asserted the entire region was sacred land and must not be
developed.149 The IBLA rejected the idea that an entire region could be
held sacred. 15o The IBLA noted the developer agreed to move the
proposed drilling sites of the exploratory wells due to expressed concerns
regarding the sensitivity of a particular site. 5 1 The administrative court
also observed that access to the region would still be relatively open, and
any religious or cultural ceremonies should not be directly affected by the
drilling. 1 52
The IBLA seemed satisfied that the developer's voluntary
adjustments to the well locations constituted a sufficient compromise
between the wishes of the tribe and the needs of the developer. If
substantive protections had been available, and were overly broad, then an
entire geothermal project could have been halted due to the feelings of a
tribe. However, as the instant case highlights, compromises cannot always
be reached, and currently the law favors geothermal development.
B. A New Approach to the Protection ofSacred Indian Sites
NEPA and the Preservation Act provide no substantive protection
for sacred Indian sites that lay outside of a reservation. An Indian tribe
seeking to halt development of such a site can only hope the federal
agency taking action "slips up" and fails to follow one of the requirements
of NEPA or the Preservation Act. However, as illustrated in Pit River,
agencies receive great deference in how they choose to cure the problem.
NEPA litigation often only delays agency action rather than blocking it.
After over five years of litigation concerning the geothermal leases at
Medicine Lake, the agency's decision has ultimately been upheld. The
agency was forced to go back and give its decision to grant a lease
extension a "hard look" and nothing else.
148 See Oregon Chapter Sierra Club, et al. The Klamath Tribes, 176 IBLA 336, 2009 WL
1138071 (IBLA 2009).
1491 Id. at 356.
50 Id.
"' Id. at 354-55.
15 Id. at 356.
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While the Tribe's concern for damage done to a site considered
sacred seems sincere, the Morongo and Klamath cases show the potential
for abuse if existing protections were given more substance. Too much
substantive protection over "sacred" sites could be abused by tribes merely
looking to preserve their commercial interests. The best approach to
giving any substantive protections "teeth" would be by amending the
Preservation Act to account for places of cultural and spiritual significance
in addition to those with historical significance. Along with its procedural
requirements, the Preservation Act also provides for a registry of historical
sites. However, the narrow definition of such places often prevents
protection for sacred Indian sites. An amendment extending protection to
sacred sites could provide tribes with the necessary security while still
allowing the use of federal lands for geothermal development. However,
any such protection would have to be mindful of the potential for
overbreadth or ulterior motives on behalf of the tribes seeking
conservation of a particular site.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Pit River Tribe failed in their attempt to use federal procedural
laws to protect land they consider sacred from geothermal development.
NEPA only delayed the inevitable approval of geothermal development in
a region the Tribe claims as sacred. Furthermore, the Preservation Act,
which would seem designed to avoid this type of harm, also provides little
shelter against agency action in this situation. However, the conflict
between the secular or sacred use of federal lands need not be decided in
total favor of one use. Amending the Preservation Act to afford some
protection to sacred Indian sites would give tribes like the Pit River Tribe
substantive protection over the important spiritual and cultural sites that
lay outside their reservation, while allowing continued development of
federal land for the evolution of geothermal energy. For those seeking to
protect sacred sites on land owned by the federal government, it looks like
the struggle will need to be taken to congress instead of the courts.
JOSHUA K. FRIEL
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